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NOTES
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES IN PENNSYLVANIA
From the mass of practically irreconcilable cases dealing with third party
beneficiary contracts in Pennsylvania there has at last come a new one,
Commonwealth v. Great American Indemnity Co.,' which is a culmination of
the trend of the decisions for the past eight years. The facts of the case
briefly are : A obtained a contract from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
to construct a new office building at Harrisburg. Under the Act of April 22,
1903, P. L. 255, it is the duty of the proper officers of the Commonwealth to
require of every contractor for public work, as a condition precedent to the
award of the contract to him, that he give approved security to pay all those
who furnish labor or materials in the performance of such contract. A
tendered such a bond as required with the defendant company as surety, yet
the bond did not expressly say that it was for the benefit of any materialman
having a just claim, but said it was for the benefit of the obligee. the Commonwealth. Through a loss by fire A became greatly indebted to B, one of the
materialmen. By authority of the Act of June 23, 1931, P. L. 1181, B brought
1312 Pa. 183, 167 At. 793, (1933).
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an action in the name of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to his own use
against the defendant surety company on its bond and recovery was allowed.
Mr. Justice Kephart in a concurring opinion specifically states "that the decision in this case overrules Greene County v. Southern Surety Co.. 292 Pa.
304", and a substantial group of cases following it,
The trend toward the decision in Commonwealth v,, Great American In-

demnity Co., supra, began with Brill P. Brill.- an excellent opinion, in
which the Supreme Court by affirming the opinion of the lower court judge,
Stern, J.. heralded its break away: from the earlier conflicting lines of decision. These.cases seem to have been decided more from a factual standpoint
than from a legal one. 4 The unfortunate reception of this decision in later
cases is to be regretted. These decisions refer to Brill v. Brill as involving a
question of public policy, thus dismissing it with a wave of the hand.- Next
in the evolutionary process came Greene County v. Southern Surety Co., supra.

Although at first blush it looks like a step backward from its worthy predecessor, still the court suggests on page 314 of the opinion that the legislature must
be the one to alter the then existing law in order to permit the materialmen
and subcontractors, the third parties of the construction bond contract, to sue
on it. The third step forward came early in 1933 with Concrete Products Co.
v. United States Fidelity 6 Guaranty Co." The facts here were identical with
those of the Greene County case and the case which is the subject of this note,
with this one pertinent exception, the bond in the Concrete Products case
specifically stated that it was not only for the benefit of the obligee, the Borough of West Reading, but also for the beneflt of the materialmen and sub-

contractors. The plaintiff, a materialman, sued the defendant surety company
in its own name on the bond and recovered, the court distinguishing the
Greene County case for the reasons given in the above italicized words. Lastly
we have the Great American Indemnity Co. case. which with the aid of a
statute and a well written opinion stands out as a new light on the question
of third party beneficiary contracts in Pennsylvania.2282 Pa. 276 (1925).
3See the comment on this case in Tasin v. Bastress. 284 Pa. 47, 57 (1925).
4Hind v. Holdship, 2 Watts 104, (1833); Blymire v. Boistle. 6 Watts 182, (1837); Adams
v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76, (1888).
sGreene Co. v. Southern Surety Co., 292 Pa. 304. 312 (1927): Book's Estate, 297 Pa. 543,
550 (1929).
6310 Pa. 158 (1933).
t
it might be well to add here that some earlier cases were decided in Pennsylvania which
correspond with the holding of Commonwealth v.Great American Indemnity Co., 312 Pa. 183,
(1933). These reached the same result because the bond given was made in pursuance of a
statute or ordinance for the protection of laborers and materialmen, and those who came with,
in the protected class were permitted to sue the surety on the bond : Philadelphia, to use, etc.
v. McLinden, 205 Pa. 172. (1903): Philadelphia v. Stewart, 195 Pa. 309. (1900); Philadelphia
v. Harry C. Nicholls Co., 214 Pa. 265, (1906). The holdings, however, are limited to the
question of whether or not the materialman or subcontractor could rightfully sue and collect
on the bond in accordance with the ordinances and do not go beyond.
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If the opinion in the Great American Indemnity Co. case is to be taken
literally, itstands on a very narrow ground. The Act of June 23, 1931, P. L.
1181, applies only to public works or improvement contracts of the Commonwealth or municipal corporations. Yet the dicta of the case extend tar beyond this limited field. It breathes a completely new manner of handling third
party beneficiary cases in Pennsylvania in the future. For example the court
quotes with approval on page 191 of the opinion from an article of Professor
Arthur L. Corbin s saying that "if there is a promise to pay money to an ascertainable person, the fact that he is a third person who gave no consideration
for the promise does not prevent him from enforcing it". In the original Professor Corbin has gone somewhat further. "The fact that he was not identified
at the time of making the contract does not prevent him from being 'ascertainable' at the time of the performance". The logic of this latter quotation is
obvious because when the surety bond contract is made, the contractor may
not know definitely and probably does not know. who his subcontractors and
materialmen will be. Fortunately the Supreme Court did not stop here but
went ahead, approving whole sections from the Restatement of the Law of
Contracts," Sections 133. 135. and 345 are quoted from at length. The
real significance of this wholehearted approval comes to a head when it is
realized that although the Great American Indemnity Co. case is a donee beneficiary case, even so the sections named above embrace the rules applicable to
donee beneficiary contracts as well as creditor beneficiary contracts. The Su-

preme Court seems to indicate in its other decisions concerning construction
bond contracts that this type of case deals with creditor beneficiaries)0 The
impetus undoubtedly came from the passage of a number of acts by the legislature in 1931 establishing the public policy of the state in regard to labor and
materialmen suing on public works contractors' building bonds.1 That the

h"Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractor's Surety Bonds", "Selected Readings in
the Law of Contracts", pp. 667, 669; 38 Yale L. J. 1.
9312Pa. 183, 192, (1933).
-0The Greene County case apparently proceeds on this theory, for it is there stated (292
Pa. at 316); "Even ifwe were to assume this to be a donee beneficiary contract, there could
be no recovery * * * ." In Concrete Products Co. v, U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 310
Pa. 158, 163, in distinguishing the Greene County case, it is stated : "The bond gave the plaintiffs in this suit the status not of mere creditor beneficiaries, but of direct promissees4'.
'Act of May 29, 1931, P. L. 243, !sec. 617.
Act of June 1, 1931. P. L. 350, sec. 2408 (h).
Act of June 9. 1931, P. L. 386, sec. 1202, cl.54.
Act of June 22, 1931, P. L, 880.
Act of June 22, 1931, P. L. 881.
Act of June 23, 1931, P. L. 932, sec. 1915.
Act of June 23, 1931, P. L. 1181.
Act of June 24. 1931, P. L. 1206, sec. 1804.
Act of June 26. 1931. P. L. 1388, sec. 13,
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Supreme Court has seen fit to extend public policy in relation to third party
beneficiary contracts by embracing the rules laid down on that subject in the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts and has thus aligned itself with its sister
courts regarding the principles to be applied in the future to such cases is a
welcome transition from the conflicting doctrines of the older cases.'"
The general rule in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts is that
creditor and donee beneficiaries are treated substantially alike, both being able
to recover as against the promisor: the former if the performance of the
promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the
beneficiary; the latter if it appears that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining
the promise of the performance thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary, or
to confer a right not due. or supposed or asserted to be due, even though he
was not in privity of contract with the promisor.
The Great American Indemnity Co. case* has solved another issue which
has caused the Supreme Court to double back on its tracks since 1925. Professor
Reese in his article'' hails Brill v. Brill, supra, thus :
"Brill v. Brill is revolutionary in another respect. It has been the
law in Pennsylvania that a third person could not sue on a contract made
for his benefit where the contract was under seal, on the ground that to
permit him to do so would permit an action on sealed instrument in assumpsit where the proper remedy should be covenant. Brill v. Brill
points out that this reason is a technicality dependent upon old rules of
pleading which no longer exist and holds that where a third person would
otherwise be permitted to sue he is not to be refused a1 remedy because
the contract upon which he seeks to sue is under seal."'
The Greene County case absolutely refused to accept this policy and said
that. "one other reason why this plaintiff cannot maintain a suit on the bond"
is because he is a third person and not a party to the sealed instrument, thus
draining Brill v. Brill of its last ounce of strength.' The court, however, in the
Great A,'zerican Indemnity Co. case saw fit to return to its earlier position and
has now settled the question once and for all. permitting a third person to sue
on a sealed instrument even though he is not a party to it and saying that the
pleadings are no longer the most important thing in litigation and consequently should not be used as instruments to defeat justice. 16
James Rick, Ill.
'-For two very able discussions as to the status of the law in Pennsylvania on third party
beneficiary cases prior to 1928 see: "Contracts for Benefit of Third Persons"; Prof. Fred S.
Reese (1925), 29 Dickinson L. R. 229; "The Law of Third Party Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania", Arthur L. Corbin (1928) 77 U. of P. L. R. 1.
1:29 Dickinson L, R. 229, 246.
'4Note 5 supra.
1.,292 Pa. 304, 316, (1927).
1,1312 Pa. 183, 188. (1933).

